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Abstract 
The seeming demise of the field of comparative economics as it evolved in the 20th century is often seen 
as the result of the collapse of the communist economy, which left us with only one economic system, 
capitalism. Moreover, the old comparative economics has been replaced by the new comparative 
economics, which focuses on varieties of capitalism and ascribes an almost exclusive explanatory role to 
institutions. I argue that the demise of the old comparative economics has more to do with the fact that it 
was fatally flawed in terms of the criteria it used for comparing economic systems rather than with the 
demise of communism or the fact that it failed to understand the causes of inter-system differences in 
outcomes. The great advantage of the new comparative economics is in its choice of a single criterion for 
judging the performance of an economic system. I illustrate these advantages of such a single criterion by 
examining the contributions of the new comparative economics to the cross country analysis income 
levels, and, on the basis of this analysis, I then suggest that there is still value in the approach of the old 
comparative economics to the analysis of economic outcomes. 
JEL classification: O1, O 47, P50, P51 
Keywords: new comparative economics, old comparative economics, institutions, comparative 
growth 
1.  Introduction 
It is commonly believed that the field of comparative economics entered 
something of a terminal crisis with the collapse of communism and the socialist 
economy in the late 1980s. For example, Djankov et al. (2003) write: 
 
The traditional field of comparative economics dealt mostly with the comparison of 
socialism and capitalism…. Traditional comparative economics ….studied under what 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on a themes first developed in a lecture to the Macedonian Academy of Sciences 
and Arts and in the Keynote Address to the 10th Biannual Conference of the European Association 
for Comparative Economic Studies. I am grateful to both organizations for the opportunity to present 
these ideas and to participants at both presentations as well as to the Editors of the European Journal 
of Comparative Economics for helpful comments. 
2 Department of Economics - Arizona State University - Box 873806 - Tempe, AZ, 85287-3806, USA 
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circumstances either the plan or the market delivers greater economic efficiency….By the time 
socialism collapsed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, this question had lost much of its 
appeal….If capitalism is triumphant, is comparative economics dead? [pp. 595-6]. 3 
Djankov et al. answer their rhetorical question somewhat ambiguously. The old 
comparative economics, as they define it is, indeed dead, they believe, but a new 
comparative economics, one that involves comparisons among capitalist systems and 
that places primary emphasis on the role of institutions is being born. They provide a 
brief manifesto for this new comparative economics:  
 
…the key comparisons are those of alternative capitalist models prevailing in different 
countries. Each capitalist country has many public and private institutions…. These differences 
(in institutions) and their consequences for economic performance are the subject of the new 
comparative economics. [p. 596] 
It can hardly be argued that the communist economy has largely disappeared as 
a subject of economic research, with the notable exception of China, which the 
advocates of the new comparative economics seem to view as a capitalist economy with 
a somewhat above-average level of state ownership of firms.
4 But, as I shall argue in this 
paper, the verdict that the old comparative economics is dead confuses what was the 
major preoccupation of the field, the detailed study and comparison of capitalist and 
socialist economies, with its methodology or its broader and more general objectives. 
This confusion of the old comparative economics with the comparisons of capitalist and 
socialist economies should not come as a surprise, nor should it be attributed to the 
unfamiliarity of “outsiders” with our field. Indeed, as Frederic Pryor (2008) very aptly 
notes,  
 
The comparative study of economic systems should ask three basic questions: What is an 
economic system? How have economic systems evolved and where are they heading? And what 
impact does an economic system have on economic performance?.... 
Given its present trajectory, the comparative study of economic systems has no future. If 
you peruse the current journals devoted to comparative economics, you mostly find either 
country studies or comparative studies of particular institutions, policies, or performance results 
between countries, but not analyses of economic systems focusing on the three basic questions. 
                                                 
3 Some readers may find this triumphalist claim for capitalism to ring a bit hollow as China appears on 
track to become the world’s biggest economy in a decade or so despite the fact that a large share of its 
GDP is produced by state-owned firms, agricultural land continues to be socially owned, and the 
Communist Party remains in charge, etc., and as many capitalist economies are contemplating 
nationalizing their banking system, the “commanding heights” of the capitalist economy.  
4 For an excellent overview of how China relates to the characteristics of a capitalist economy and to the 
lessons of the new comparative economics, see Jefferson (2008).  
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This paper presents five theses, not all of which I develop to the same extent. 
The first thesis is that comparative economics was, and continues to be, a broader 
intellectual enterprise than the comparison of capitalist and socialist economic systems. 
Indeed, I argue that comparative economics as traditionally constituted is fundamental 
to the discipline of economics in toto. My second thesis is that the old comparative 
economics was based on concepts and methodologies that both a priori reasoning and 
experience show to be useful for the description of economic systems. However, and 
this is a critical caveat, the old comparative economics paradigm burdened itself with a 
fundamental flaw that prevented it, and prevents it to this day, from fulfilling the 
potential that is inherent in its descriptive and analytical apparatus. The third thesis is 
that the appeal of the new comparative economics has less to do with the disappearance 
of socialist economies or with the explanatory power of the concept of “institutions” 
that lie at the core of the new comparative economics and much more to do with the 
fact that that the new comparative economics has, perhaps unconsciously, managed to 
overcome the fatal weakness that plagued the old comparative economics. In this sense, 
the new comparative economics appears to be able to explain more of the questions 
economists ask than does the old comparative economics. To illustrate this greater 
explanatory power, I will review some of the recent literature on inter-country 
differences in per capita incomes and their growth that are based on the concepts of the 
new comparative economics. From this analysis, I will argue, as my fourth thesis, that, 
whatever its advantages, the new comparative economics, in comparison with the old 
comparative economics, leads to a significant limit on questions that comparative 
economics can ask and excessively constrains the explanations for differences in 
economic performance that fall within the realm of acceptable discourse. This then 
leads to the fifth and final thesis that there remains considerable value in the 
methodological framework of the old comparative economics if its criteria for judging 
the performance of systems can be aligned with the criterion used by the new.  
2.  Thesis One: The Centrality of Comparative Economics 
A central question asked by philosophers is: what is the good life? 
Correspondingly, the central question asked by economists has been: what makes for a 
good economic system?
5 Framed this broadly, comparative economics then seeks to 
answer this fundamental question of our discipline, one that every great, and not so 
great, economist has sought to answer in one way or another. Moreover, in answering 
this question, economists have generally accepted that their inquiry should include the 
evaluation of differences in systems going well beyond the variants of capitalism to 
which the advocates of the new comparative economics now wish to limit its scope.  
The emergence of socialism and central planning, both as a theoretical 
possibility in the Lerner-Lange debates and as a reality in the USSR, East Europe, China 
and elsewhere had both positive and negative effects on the development of 
comparative economics. On the positive side of the ledger, it led to the creation of a 
value-free and scientific way of describing economic systems most notably by 
Koopmans and Montias (1971) and Montias (1976). On the negative side, the stark 
                                                 
5 At least this was the question asked by early philosophers before philosophy became an “academic” 
subject and also the question asked by economists at least through Adam Smith.  
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differences between the capitalist and socialist economic systems clearly did focus 
research on a set of stark, though not unimportant, system differences such as the plan 
versus the market, centralized versus decentralized decision making, social versus private 
ownership, etc.
6 However, to identify these specific research themes with the entirety of 
the field of comparative economics is to confuse the past research preoccupations of 
the practitioners of comparative economics with the field’s fundamental concepts and 
objectives. 
3.  Thesis Two: The Paradigm of Old Comparative Economics Is Sound 
but It Has a Fatal Flaw 
A. The Strengths of the Old Paradigm 
Koopmans and Montias (1971) and extensions by Montias (1976) and Montias et 
al. (1994) proposed a conceptual framework for the value-free description of economic 
systems. While this effort clearly contained a number of original insights and concepts, 
in many ways it was also a systematization of the concepts and approaches that were 
commonly accepted by comparative economists as witnessed, for example, by the 
textbooks on comparative economics of that era.
7  
The economic outcomes of a country, or whatever the unit of analysis may be, 
were seen as influenced by three factors, the environment, the economic system, and the 
policies followed by the country. In turn, the environment consisted of the country’s 
starting conditions, the preferences of the economic agents who made up the system, 
resources and technology available to the country, the existing organizations and 
institutions and the country’s location. The system consisted of rules, both formal and 
informal; institutions, generally construed more narrowly than they are by the new 
comparative economics; and mechanisms. These mechanisms, packaged by Neuberger and 
Duffy (1976) under the rather unfortunate acronym “DIM”, consisted of decision-making 
authority, meaning who in the economy had the power to make decisions about the 
allocation of which resources; information, which described the information generated by 
the system and its distribution among agents; and motivation, which characterized the 
means available to induce agents to make decisions and supply effort and other 
productive resources under their control. Finally, policies were seen as a special set of 
rules that were valid for relatively short periods of time and whose alteration would not 
change the essential nature of the system.
8 
                                                 
6 It is perhaps superfluous to add that such a judgment on the research undertaken in the 1950s and 
1960s, when the socialist model looked rather formidable in its ability to marshal resources for 
manifestly higher rates of growth than were evident in market economies and to avoid the cyclical 
fluctuations that were feared for the post-WWII period as a result of the experiences of the Great 
Depression, can only be made with the benefit of hindsight.  
7 See for, example, Gregory and Stuart (1985, Ch. 2) and subsequent editions or Neuberger and Duffy 
(1976). 
8 The common sense of this was that a change in the VAT rate from 15% to 12% would not involve a 
fundamental change in an economic system and would fall into the policy category; the abolition of a 
VAT tax and its replacement by an income tax would be seen as a change in a formal rule, and thus a 
change in the system itself. Such a distinction between policy changes and system change is actually  
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This framework, I would submit, is based on a useful and comprehensive set of 
concepts and principles that should be able to describe and classify economic systems 
and to facilitate comparisons between, and analyses of, different economies and the 
outcomes they generate. Moreover, unless the new comparative economics chooses a 
definition of “institutions” that is so broad as to make the term useless as an analytic 
concept, it is obvious that the old comparative economics offers a richer and more 
realistic link between economic outcomes and their causes: environment, system, which 
we may provisionally equate with institutions, and polices.  
B. And the Fatal Flaw of the Old Paradigm 
The fatal flaw of the old comparative economics as an intellectual enterprise and 
the seeming success of new comparative economics thus were not due to the former’s 
inability to set out the fundamental links between system and outcomes but in its choice 
of criteria for evaluating systems, which were descriptive rather than prescriptive. Thus, 
Koopmans and Montias (1971), for example, proposed to judge economic systems on 
the basis of at least six criteria, including high per capita consumption, its growth, equity 
in its distribution, the stability of employment and income, etc.
9 These, in some cases 
obviously conflicting, criteria are not ranked lexicographically nor are weights assigned 
to them. One option for operationalizing comparisons would be to have the researcher 
choose the appropriate weights to be assigned to various outcome indicators, but in that 
case, as Hewett (1978, p. 104) points out, “who cares which system wins the 
sweepstakes?” Alternatively, each system’s outcomes can be weighted by its rulers’ or 
citizens’ preferences, in which case comparisons become irrelevant due both to the 
tradeoffs between various outcome measures and to differences between systems in 
tastes over outcomes.  
Thus, while the criteria of the old comparative economics help explain why a 
system produces the outcomes that it does, it makes any effort to compare systems in a 
normative sense, that is, to say which system is “better”, virtually impossible. The 
strength and the appeal of the new comparative economics is precisely that it is 
unicausal, emphasizing institutions as the main drivers of differences in economic 
outcomes, and it has only one criterion, per capita income (or in some cases its growth) 
by which to judge economic performance.
10 Thus by offering “less” in the way of 
conceptualizing economic systems and the link between systems and outcomes than did 
the old comparative economics, the new comparative economics is able to offer “more” 
in the way of concrete results on which economic system is better according to a single 
generally acceptable criterion.
11  
                                                                                                                                          
quite problematic for both the old and the new comparative economics, as Hewett (1978, p. 103) 
points out in his review of Montias (1976). I return to this problem later in this essay. 
9 The Koopmans-Montias criteria reflect the work of Balassa (1959, Ch 4) who proposed a more limited 
list such as static efficiency, dynamic efficiency, actual growth of output, etc. as the criteria by which to 
evaluate economic systems. Re-reading Balassa’s analysis of the Hungarian economy on the basis of 
his criteria reveals that it remains a compelling case for the use of these multiple criteria for descriptive 
purposes. 
10 I am happy to accept the point that the better empirical work spawned by the new comparative 
economics tries to control for the effects of environment (though generally being some what hostile 
to, say, geographic effects), but I believe that, taken more broadly, my statement holds.  
11 If one had applied the new comparative economics to compare the Soviet and Chinese economic 
systems to those of the United States and Europe in the 1960s, the higher per capita incomes of the  
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4.  Thesis Three: Less Is More: Contributions of the New Comparative 
Economics to Our Understanding of Economic Growth 
A. Some Valuable Results 
One of the most visible contributions of the new comparative economics is to 
our understanding of what Kuznets (1966) termed modern economic growth. In this 
section, I will briefly sketch the concept of modern economic growth and highlight 
several noteworthy contributions that the new comparative economics has made to our 
understanding of the sources of this growth. The seminal empirical contribution that 
defined the study of modern economic growth was that of Solow (1957) who estimated 
that of the entire change in output per worker in the US economy in the first half of the 
20
th century, about 13 percent was due to increases in capital per worker and the 
remaining 87 percent was due to an increase in total factor productivity (TFP). Thus, 
understanding the sources of TFP growth was critical to the understanding of modern 
economic growth and of differences in per capita income between countries or economic 
systems.  
To put the contributions of new comparative economics into perspective, I 
briefly review the stylized facts about economic growth, drawing on Prescott (1998). 
Before about 1800, per capita incomes were roughly the same in major civilizations 
around the world, and they grew only slowly. After 1800, in Europe, per capita income 
growth increased by twenty-fold per century. Since the end of World War II, there has 
been an acceleration of per capita income growth elsewhere, principally in Asia. Because 
the main source of this growth is TFP improvements, any understanding of the link 
between economic systems and TFP growth would constitute an important component 
of the field of comparative economics. Moreover, as both Prescott (1998) and Hall and 
Jones (1999) forcefully demonstrate, TFP not only explains cross-country differences in 
the growth of per capita income, it largely determines the international differences in the 
levels of per capita income as well. For example, Hall and Jones show that, of the 35-fold 
difference in per capita incomes between Niger and the United States, 12 percent is 
accounted for by differences in per capita endowments of capital, 25 percent is accounted 
for by differences in human capital and the remaining 63 percent is accounted for by 
differences in TFP. Thus, if we could discover the sources of TFP differences, we 
would make a signal contribution to comparative economics, and the new comparative 
economists have clearly been in the forefront of the effort to do this.  
Very briefly, the literature suggests that environmental factors such as natural 
resources are not important, nor are starting conditions, because all countries started 
from more or less the same level. Location appears to play a mixed role; somewhat 
controversially, location near the equator may not be a source of low TFP or its growth, 
while having a coast line appears to have a positive effect on TFP. Policy, with the 
exception of Prescott (1998), does not appear much in this work, and thus the major 
                                                                                                                                          
latter would have easily “shown” the superiority of capitalism. Such a conclusion would not have 
helped our understanding of socialism or of what was happening in these economies very much, and 
in this sense the multi-faceted Balassa-Koopmans-Montias criteria were helpful in the short term, 
although obviously not in the long term, to the development of comparative economics.   
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explanatory factor has been institutions, as Djankov et al. (2003) state in their manifesto 
for the new comparative economics cited at the beginning of this essay.
12  
The value of an approach that takes TFP differences as the key determinant of 
the only criterion for judging economic systems, per capita income, and attempts to link 
TFP to institutions is evident in the work of Hall and Jones(1999) cited above. They 
take a sample of a large number of countries and show that the differences in per capita 
income are largely the result of differences in TFP. They posit that differences in TFP 
are the outcome of what they call differences in social infrastructure, by which they 
mean institutions that provide protection from predation by government and by other 
individuals. They consider measures of the risk of expropriation, bureaucratic quality, 
provision of law and order, corruption, and government repudiation of contracts as 
important indicators of protection against domestic predation, and openness to trade, 
low tariffs, etc., as protection against external predation.
13  
The authors of the study recognize that causality is not unidirectional and that 
countries with higher per capita incomes are likely to also have better institutions. Thus, 
in their empirical work they use two-stage least squares estimation, and, as instruments 
for their index of institutional quality, they use a number of variables such as “European 
influence”, measured by the country’s distance from the equator and if a European 
language is spoken, and predicted trade flows drawn from a gravity equation.
14 The 
results are clear: differences in institutions explain differences in TFP, and differences in 
TFP explain (most of) the differences in per capita incomes.  
At about the same time the Hall and Jones paper was published, Frankel and 
Roemer (1999) published a paper entitled “Does Trade Cause Growth?” that examined 
the effect of trade, or, more correctly, the trade to GDP ratio, on per capita output and 
its growth. They, too, recognize the endogeneity problem, and they construct an 
instrument for the trade share also using a gravity equation. Their argument is that: 
 
…countries’ geographic characteristics are not affected by their incomes, or by government 
policies and other factors that influence income….[t]hus countries’ geographic characteristics 
can be used as instrumental variables to obtain estimates of trade’s impact on income. [p. 380] 
Frankel and Roemer’s results show that trade has a positive effect on both the 
level and growth of per capita output and that most of this effect operates through the 
impact of trade on TFP. Again, given the link found by Hall and Jones between 
institutions and TFP, Frankel and Roemer’s results can be seen as providing a further 
connection between openness and the quality of institutions and thus of TFP levels and 
their growth.  
                                                 
12 This emphasis on the centrality of institutions owes much to the work of North. See, for example, 
North (1990, 1998). 
13 One might question whether low tariffs are a policy or an “institution”.  
14 The gravity equation posits that trade between any two countries depends on the economic 
characteristics such as income and population as well as geographic characteristics such as the distance 
between them, whether they have a coast line, etc. See Andersen (1979) or Bergstrand (1985). For 
obvious reasons neither of the studies described here uses the full gravity equation specification.   
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B. But How Should We Interpret Them? 
The proponents of the new comparative economics would clearly interpret the 
Hall and Jones results as powerful evidence that institutions are a major determinant of 
TFP levels in individual countries.
15 However, when viewed in combination with the 
results and methodology of the Frankel and Roemer study, the claims for the key role of 
institutions become problematic along the following dimensions:  
Accounting for changes in per capita income over time. If institutions can be well proxied 
by geographic factors that do not change much, if at all, over time, this would imply that 
institutions themselves also do not change much if the relationship between the 
instruments and actual institutions is to be stable over time. Because institutions 
determine TFP, we would then expect that a country’s TFP, or, more important, its 
TFP relative to other countries, would not change over time either, and convergence or 
“catch-up” by some countries would be impossible. The only way the theory can 
account for changes in the level of country’s TFP relative to other countries from year 
to year would be to posit that each year there is a new relationship that is established 
between the (mostly) time-invariant instruments and the institutions being instrumented 
as well as between these instrumented measures of “institutions” and TFP. The stylized 
facts presented by Prescott (1989) clearly indicate that TFP growth, and thus relative 
TFP levels, vary considerably among countries and over time. Casual empirics show that 
institutions at times do change quite quickly and extensively.
16 Thus, proponents of the 
new comparative economics appear to be trying to use a relationship between invariant 
instruments, varying institutions and varying relative TFP levels to demonstrate the 
long-term validity of the relationship between fundamental institutions and economic 
performance. But the only way that this relationship can hold and yet be consistent with 
the facts is if the relationship between invariant instruments, institutions and TFP levels 
itself is fluid, that is that the regression parameters linking instruments to institutions 
and institutions to TFP varies over time in ways we neither know nor understand. 
However, such a shifting relationship implied by a realistic interpretation of the 
empirical work is at odds with the theoretical connection between institutions and 
economic performance claimed by the new comparative economics and with the policy 
prescriptions of the new comparative economics that call for the adoption of the same 
“good” institutions by all countries that seek to raise their TFP.  
Can the same set of instruments explain everything? It is somewhat unsettling to see that 
roughly the same set of instruments is used to estimate quite different economic 
variables and then to see these estimates of causal variables linked to TFP levels or 
levels of per capita income. Thus Hall and Jones use gravity-equation estimated measures 
of trade to estimate “institutions” in the first stage of their 2SLS estimates, and these 
estimates of the institutions to explain TFP levels. Frankel and Roemer use more or less 
the same “estimated” trade flows to instrument openness and then estimate the effect of 
this instrumented openness on TFP levels. In the end, to the cynical observer it would 
                                                 
15 This approach itself carries some implicit assumptions and limitations on the research agenda for the 
new comparative economics that are generally unappreciated but that are potentially limiting as well. 
See Paldam and Gundlach (2007). 
16 The transition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is perhaps the most obvious example 
of this, but by no means the only one.   
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appear that whatever “explanation” for, or theory of, TFP levels one proposes, so long 
as the explanatory variable is proxied in a 2SLS procedure by trade flows derived from 
the (partial) gravity equation, then it is likely that the “theory” will in the end be verified.  
A second problem is that the same explanatory variable, institutions, is used in 
different studies to explain both cross-country differences in TFP levels and cross-
country differences in TFP growth, and that these institutions are instrumented by the 
same gravity-equation-calculated instruments. But, the stylized facts are that there are 
important differences between the cross-country distribution of TFP levels and TFP 
growth. Given this, what conclusions one should draw about the role of institutions in 
influencing the level and growth of per capital income around the world is not as clear 
as needs to be.  
5.  Theses Four and Five: New Comparative Economics Is Limiting 
Because It Leaves Out Policy and Policy Is Important 
The studies conducted in the framework of the new comparative economics 
described above take no account of policy differences. Outcomes are largely explained 
by institutional differences, themselves the products of relatively immutable forces such 
as colonial past, location, etc., an approach that seems to leave little or no room for 
policy as a determinant of economic outcomes. Such a stance might be acceptable either 
if institutions are defined so broadly as to include policies under the rubric of 
institutions or if policies were largely determined by the institutional environment in 
which they are framed. The latter point of view has some validity; institutions do 
influence polices in explicit ways. For example, there is an extensive literature 
demonstrating that institutionalizing central bank independence does improve the 
quality of monetary policy and results in lower inflation rates. As another example, 
consider von Hagen (1992) and von Hagen and Harden (1995) who show quite 
persuasively that budgetary institutions do influence the quality of fiscal policy. 
Nevertheless, the proposition that all economic policy is endogenous and determined by 
economic and political institutions has yet to be put forward much less verified by 
empirical research.. 
Part of the problem of discussing the relative role of institutions and policy is 
that the boundary between the two is not always clear, as Footnote 11 suggests. Montias 
(1976) attempts to do so, by defining “rules”, which in his framework are analogous to 
institutions, as “stipulating or constraining the actions of a set of participants for an 
indefinite period and under specified states of these individuals’ environment” (p. 18). 
Such a definition is quite consistent with the definition of institutions used by the new 
comparative economics. Montias also defines policy as “a class of contingent decisions, 
frequently announced … with a view to creating stable expectations about the future 
decisions of the policy maker” (p. 18). It is true that policies are generally contingent 
and that policy announcements are intended to convey information about future 
contingent acts. But, the economic purpose of policy is missing from this definition, 
because, after all, we view policies as ways of obtaining certain economic outcomes. 
Montias’ definition may thus not be entirely in tune with the common use of the term 
policy, which in every day usage applies to the parameterization of institutional 
characteristics. Thus, openness to trade is seen as an institution, while tariff levels for  
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individual goods are a matter of policy; low predation by the state is an institution, while 
income tax rates are policies.  
At an intuitive level, institutions are viewed as system characteristics that are 
broader in their reach and more immutable in nature than policies. Changes in 
institutions almost always result in changes in systems; policy changes do not necessarily 
lead to system changes. Moreover, institutions map into economic outcomes relatively 
uniquely, so that property rights, rule of law, etc. generally map into good economic 
outcomes and lack of these institutions maps into bad economic performance. In 
contrast, the mapping from institutions to policies to outcomes is less rigid. To quote 
Rodrik (2003): 
…first-order economic principles—protection of property rights, contract enforcement, 
market-based competition, appropriate incentives, sound money, debt sustainability—do not 
map into unique policy packages. 
Rodrik’s reference to first-order economic principles, which we may view as 
institutions, suggests one potential distinction between institutions and policies: the 
former deal with fundamental system characteristics and the latter with the “details” of 
implementation. Rodrik himself cautions against this interpretation, arguing that “the 
empirical research on national institutions has generally focused on the protection of 
property rights and the rule of law. But one should think of institutions along a much 
wider spectrum.” Thus tipping, giving children an allowance, etc., although seemingly 
trivial in nature, are also institutions consistent with Montias’ definition.  
To show the key importance of policies in determining economic outcomes, we 
turn to an example also drawn from the literature on TFP. Prescott (1998) stresses that 
TFP growth and levels are inversely related to the ability of incumbent workers to 
prevent the adoption of new work rules and ways of organizing production that would 
fully exploit the productive potential of newly available technologies in order to protect 
the rents that the workers are able to earn using older technologies or ways of 
organizing their work. This posits a central role for labor market policies and firm-level 
investment and human-resources policies in determining TFP. Here, the old 
comparative economics, with its more balanced view of the determinants of economic 
outcomes offers some useful lessons.  
The USSR and the countries of East Europe saw gains in TFP come to a virtual 
halt in the early 1980s, if not even before then, an event unprecedented among countries 
at such a level of development.
17 This collapse of TFP growth can be understood in 
terms of David Granick’s (1989) description of the Soviet economy as a “job-rights 
economy”. What Granick meant was that not only were Soviet, and East European, 
workers protected against unemployment by an explicit policy of maintaining excess 
aggregate demand for labor, but that, as a matter of policy, these workers also had a 
more or less explicit right to a particular job at a particular location. At the start of the 
Soviet experiment, this was not a problem for productivity growth as millions of new, 
                                                 
17 The first to note the slowdown in TFP growth in the USSR was Kaplan (1968) who showed that, for 
any plausible parameter values of a Cobb-Douglas production function, Soviet TFP growth was falling 
toward zero.  
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unskilled, workers were brought into factories from agriculture; they had no rents to 
preserve and no understanding of their job rights. However, as the system evolved, and 
workers gained tenure at their places of work, they became increasingly aware of their 
rights, and, through skills acquired on the job, they were also increasingly able to earn 
rents from operating the existing technology. Such workers thus had both the ability and 
the incentives to block the efficient introduction of new technologies and ways of 
working. As a result, increasingly, new technology and ways of fully exploiting its 
productivity-enhancing characteristics could only be introduced into newly-built and 
staffed factories but not into existing ones, thereby sharply reducing TFP growth, 
especially when the growth of the labor force slowed, limiting the possibilities for 
opening new factories.
18  
In the course of the transition, these job rights disappeared both because the 
joblessness created by the transition recession reduced workers’ bargaining power and 
because socialist-era laws providing these job rights were swept away. Moreover, given 
the collapse of many of the key communist-era industries, the rents earned by the 
entrenched industrial elite of the work force disappeared. The transition also created 
new owners, whether domestic or foreign, who were less willing to accept, and more 
able to overcome, worker resistance to new technologies or work rules, and, given the 
environment of the early transition, they were able to enforce their will. Thus, in the 
Prescott-Granick view, the post-1989 increase in TFP growth in the transition countries 
is thus the result of policy changes, not of institutional change.  
Moreover, policies that influence such work-place inflexibilities are seen by 
many observers as the cause of slow TFP and economic growth in the European Union 
relative to the United States, whose labor market and income tax policies are seen as 
being more flexible and work-friendly. Proponents of the new comparative economics 
may seek to label many of these labor market impediments as “institutions”, but, as we 
have already noted, this seems to suggest that there are no policies and everything is 
subsumed under the label of “institution” or there is a strong and unique causal 
relationship running from institutions to policies, thus completely endogenizing policies.  
Both of the above approaches are inconsistent with the facts in that people view 
labor market impediments as well as many other determinants of economic 
performance as policies, and policies that are subject to change. The truth of this 
proposition is to be found in the fact that most of the economic debates about 
government actions have to do with the shaping of economic policies: tax rates, fiscal 
stimuli, subsidies, labor market policies, etc. and not with changes in institutions. The 
old comparative economics may have neglected institutions in favor of policy and 
system differences, but we should be careful not to have the pendulum swing too far the 
other way. Doubtless, institutions are an important driver of long-term economic 
progress, but policies matter as well, and it behooves us to attempt to learn where 
policies come from and what effects they have in the long run.  
 
                                                 
18 This problem was partially understood by the Soviets. Gorbachev’s policy of “acceleration” was based 
on the massive introduction of new, western, machinery into existing factories, but, as Granick would 
have predicted, this was much easier said then done.  
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